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Abstract—Remote code disclosure attacks threaten embedded
systems as they allow attackers to steal intellectual property or
to find reusable code for use in control-flow hijacking attacks.
Execute-only memory (XOM) prevents remote code disclosures,
but existing XOM solutions either require a memory management
unit that is not available on ARM embedded systems or incur
significant overhead.
We present PicoXOM: a fast and novel XOM system for
ARMv7-M and ARMv8-M devices which leverages ARM’s Data
Watchpoint and Tracing unit along with the processor’s simplified
memory protection hardware. On average, PicoXOM incurs
0.33% performance overhead and 5.89% code size overhead on
two benchmark suites and five real-world applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
Remote code disclosure attacks threaten computer systems.
Using a buffer overread vulnerability [39], not only can a
remote attacker steal intellectual property e.g., proprietary
application code, for reverse engineering, but she can use
the leaked code to locate gadgets for advanced code reuse
attacks [35] against systems deploying code layout diversi-
fication defenses like Address Space Layout Randomization
(ASLR) [30]. Embedded Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices ex-
acerbate the situation; many of these microcontroller-based
systems have the same Internet connectivity as desktops and
servers but rarely employ protections against attacks [21], [34].
Given the ubiquity of these embedded devices in industrial
production and in our lives, making them immune to code
disclosure attacks is crucial.
Recent research [6]–[8], [10], [13], [17]–[19], [24], [31],
[42] implements execute-only memory (XOM) to defend
against code disclosure attacks. XOM enforces memory pro-
tection on the code region so that instruction fetching is
allowed but reading or writing instructions as data is disal-
lowed. This simple and effective defense, however, is not na-
tively available on low-end microcontrollers. For example, the
ARMv7-M and ARMv8-M architectures used in mainstream
devices support memory protection but not execute-only (XO)
permissions [3], [4]. uXOM [24] implements XOM on ARM
embedded systems but incurs non-negligible performance and
code size overhead (7.3% and 15.7%, respectively) as it trans-
forms most load instructions into special unprivileged load
instructions. Given embedded systems’ real-time constraints
and limited memory resources, we argue an embedded XOM
solution must have close-to-zero performance penalty and less
resource usage overhead to be usable in practice.
This paper presents PicoXOM, a fast and novel XOM
system for ARMv7-M and ARMv8-M devices using a mem-
ory protection unit (MPU) and on-chip debugging facilities.
Specifically, the Data Watchpoint and Tracing (DWT) unit
is one of the debug features available on ARMv7-M and
ARMv8-M architectures [3], [4]. PicoXOM uses the MPU
to enforce write protection on code and uses the address
range matching capability of the DWT unit to monitor read
accesses to the code region. On a matched access, the DWT
unit generates a debug monitor exception indicating an illegal
code read, while unmatched accesses execute normally without
slowdown. As PicoXOM disallows all read accesses to the
code segment, it includes a minimal compiler change that
removes all data embedded in the code segment.
We built a prototype of PicoXOM and evaluated it on an
ARMv7-M board with two benchmark suites and five real-
world embedded applications. Our results show that PicoXOM
adds negligible performance overhead of 0.33% and only has
a small code size increase of 5.89% while providing strong
protection against code disclosure attacks. To summarize, our
contributions are:
• PicoXOM: a novel method of utilizing the ARMv7-M
and ARMv8-M debugging facilities to implement XOM.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first use of ARM
debug features for security purposes.
• A prototype implementation of PicoXOM on ARMv7-M.
• An evaluation of PicoXOM’s performance and code size
impact on the BEEBS benchmark suite, the CoreMark-
Pro benchmark suite, and five real-world embedded appli-
cations, showing that PicoXOM only incurs 0.33% run-
time overhead and 5.89% code size overhead.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
provides background information on ARMv7-M and ARMv8-
M. Section III describes our threat model and assumptions.
Sections IV and V present the design and implementation of
PicoXOM, respectively. Section VI reports on our evaluation
of PicoXOM, Section VII discusses related work, and Sec-
tion VIII concludes the paper and discusses future work.
II. BACKGROUND
PicoXOM targets ARMv7-M and ARMv8-M architectures
which cover a wide range of embedded devices on the market,
and it leverages unique features of these architectures. This
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Fig. 1. Memory Layout of ARMv7-M and ARMv8-M Architectures
section provides important background material on the in-
struction sets, execution modes, address space layout, memory
protection mechanisms, and on-chip debug support found in
ARMv7-M and ARMv8-M.
A. Instruction Sets and Execution Modes
ARMv7-M [3] and ARMv8-M [4] are the mainstream M-
profile ARM architectures for embedded microcontrollers.
Unlike ARM’s A and R profiles, they only support the Thumb
instruction set which is a mixture of 16-bit and 32-bit densely-
encoded Thumb instructions.
ARMv7-M [3] supports two execution modes: thread mode
(unprivileged) and handler mode (privileged). An ARMv7-
M processor always executes exception handlers in privileged
mode, while application code is allowed to execute in either
mode. Code running in unprivileged mode can raise the current
execution mode to privileged mode using a supervisor call
instruction (SVC). This is typically how ARMv7-M realizes
system calls. However, embedded applications usually run in
privileged mode to reduce the cost of system calls.
ARMv8-M inherits all the features of ARMv7-M and adds
a security extension called TrustZone-M [4] that isolates
software into a secure world and a non-secure world; this
effectively doubles the execution modes as software can be
executing in either world, privileged or unprivileged.
B. Address Space Layout
Both ARMv7-M [3] and ARMv8-M [4] architectures oper-
ate on a single 32-bit physical address space and use memory-
mapped I/O to access external devices and peripherals. As
Figure 1 shows, the address space is generally divided into
eight consecutive 512 MB regions; the Code region maps
flash memory/ROM that contains code and read-only data,
the SRAM region typically contains heaps and stacks, and
the System region holds memory-mapped system registers
including a Private Peripheral Bus (PPB) subregion. The PPB
subregion contains all critical system registers such as MPU
configuration registers and the Vector Table Offset Register
VTOR. All other regions are for memory-mapped peripherals
and external devices. Note that ARMv7-M and ARMv8-M
do not have special privileged instructions to access system
registers mapped in the System region; instead, they can be
modified by regular load and store instructions.
C. Memory Protection Unit
ARMv7-M and ARMv8-M devices do not have a memory
management unit (MMU) that supports virtual memory; in-
stead, they may have an optional MPU that can be configured
to enforce region-based access control on physical mem-
ory [3], [4]. A typical ARMv7-M device supports up to 8 MPU
regions, each of which is configurable with a base address, a
power-of-two size from 32 bytes to 4 GB, and separate access
permissions (R, W, and X) for privileged and unprivileged
modes. With TrustZone-M, ARMv8-M has separate MPU
configurations for secure and non-secure worlds [4]. MPU
configuration registers are in the PPB region.
There are, however, limitations on how one can configure
access permissions for an MPU region. First, the privileged
access permission cannot be more restrictive than the unpriv-
ileged one; this prohibits an MPU region with, for exam-
ple, unprivileged read-write and privileged read-only permis-
sions. Second, the PPB region is always privileged-accessible,
unprivileged-inaccessible, and non-executable regardless of
the MPU configuration. Third, and most importantly, the
MPU does not have the execute-only permission necessary
to support XOM; an MPU region is executable only if it is
configured as both readable and executable.
D. Debug Support
Debug support is another processor feature that ARMv7-
M and ARMv8-M devices can optionally support. Of all
components in the architecture’s debug support, we focus on
the DWT unit [3], [4] which provides groups of debug registers
called DWT comparators that support instruction/data address
matching, PC value tracing, cycle counters, and many other
functionalities. What is most important to PicoXOM is the
ability of a DWT comparator to match an address range for
data accesses; if the processor reads from or writes to an
address within a specified range, the DWT comparator will halt
the software execution or generate a debug monitor exception.
If, instead, the access does not fall into the specified range,
it will get no performance impact and proceed as normal. If
multiple DWT comparators are configured for data address
range matching, an access that hits any of them will trap.
On ARMv7-M, a DWT comparator can be configured to
match an address range by programming its base address with
a mask that specifies a power-of-two range size [3]. ARMv8-
M implements DWT address range matching by using two
consecutively numbered DWT comparators [4], where the first
one specifies the lower bound of the address range and the
second one specifies the upper bound.
III. THREAT MODEL AND SYSTEM ASSUMPTIONS
We assume a buggy but unmalicious application running
on an embedded device with memory safety vulnerabilities
that allow a remote attacker to read or write arbitrary memory
locations. The attacker wants to either steal proprietary ap-
plication code for purposes like reverse engineering or learn
the application code layout in order to launch code reuse
attacks such as Return-into-libc [40] and Return-Oriented
Programming (ROP) [33] attacks. Physical and offline attacks
are out of scope as we believe such attacks can be stopped by
orthogonal defenses [22], [34]. Our threat model also assumes
the application code and data is diversified, using techniques
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Fig. 2. PicoXOM Workflow. PicoXOM components are shown in blue.
such as those in EPOXY [12]. Therefore, remotely tricking
the buggy application into reading its code content becomes a
reasonable choice for the attacker.
We assume that the target embedded device supports MPU
and DWT with enough configurable MPU regions and DWT
comparators. We assume that the device is running a single
bare-metal application statically linked with libraries, boot se-
quences, and exception handlers. The application is assumed to
run in privileged mode, as Section II-A dictates. For ARMv8-
M devices with TrustZone-M, the application is assumed to
reside in the non-secure world, while software in the secure
world is trusted.
IV. DESIGN
Figure 2 shows PicoXOM’s overall design. PicoXOM con-
sists of three components that together implement a strong and
efficient XOM on ARM embedded devices. First, PicoXOM
uses a specially-configured DWT configuration to detect read
accesses to program code. Second, it utilizes a special MPU
configuration that prevents write access to the code region
and prevents writeable memory from being executable. Third,
it employs a small change to the LLVM compiler [25] to
eliminate constant data embedded within the code region.
To use PicoXOM, an embedded application developer
merely compiles her code with the PicoXOM compiler and in-
stalls it on her embedded ARM device. On boot, the PicoXOM
run-time configures MPU regions and DWT comparators using
PicoXOM’s MPU and DWT configurations and then passes
control to the compiled embedded software.
A. W⊕X with MPU
PicoXOM requires that memory either be writeable or
executable but not both i.e., the W⊕X policy [29]; otherwise,
an attacker could simply inject code or overwrite code to
achieve arbitrary code execution. To enforce W⊕X, PicoXOM
configures the MPU regions at device boot time so that the
code region is readable and executable, read-only data is
read-only, and RAM regions are readable and writable. Note
that the MPU cannot configure memory to be executable
but unreadable; the MPU can configure a memory region as
executable only if it is also configured as readable [3], [4].
PicoXOM runs application code in privileged mode and
configures a background MPU region to allow read and write
access to the remainder of the address space such as periph-
erals. This, however, leaves critical memory-mapped system
registers in the PPB (such as MPU configuration registers
and VTOR) open to modifications, which can be leveraged
by an attacker to turn off MPU protections or, even worse,
implant a custom exception handler. Section IV-B discusses
how PicoXOM prevents such cases.
B. R⊕X with DWT
PicoXOM leverages ARM’s DWT comparators to watch
over the whole code region for read accesses. As Section II-D
states, each (pair) of DWT comparators available on an ARM
microcontroller can be configured to generate a debug monitor
exception when a memory access of a specified type to an
address within a specified range occurs. PicoXOM therefore
uses one (pair) of the available DWT comparators as follows:
1) At device boot time, PicoXOM configures a DWT com-
parator register (say DWT_COMP<n>) to hold the lower
bound of the code region.
2) PicoXOM then sets the address-matching range by ei-
ther writing the upper bound of the code region to
the next DWT comparator register DWT_COMP<n+1>
(for ARMv8-M) or writing the correct mask to the
corresponding DWT mask register DWT_MASK<n> (for
ARMv7-M).
3) PicoXOM enables the DWT comparator (pair) by con-
figuring the DWT function register DWT_FUNC<n>
for data address reads. For ARMv8-M devices,
DWT_FUNC<n+1> is also configured in order to form
address range matching.
4) Finally, PicoXOM enables the debug monitor exception
by setting the MON_EN bit (bit 16) of the Debug Excep-
tion and Monitor Control Register DEMCR.
With a DWT comparator (pair) set up for monitoring read
accesses to the code region, R⊕X is effectively enforced.
However, as Section IV-A stated, the DWT registers and
DEMCR are also memory-mapped system registers which could
be modified by vulnerable application code. An attacker could
leverage such a buffer overflow vulnerability to reconfigure the
debug registers to neutralize PicoXOM.
We can address the issue in two ways. One approach is
to break the assumption that PicoXOM runs everything in
privileged mode. As code running in unprivileged mode has no
access to the PPB region regardless of the MPU configuration,
the system registers that PicoXOM must protect (e.g., MPU
configuration registers, DWT registers, DEMCR, and VTOR) are
all in the PPB region and therefore inherently safe from unpriv-
ileged tampering. However, this approach requires PicoXOM
to implement system calls that support privileged operations
which application code could previously perform, incurring
expensive context switching between privilege modes. The
other approach is to use extra (pairs of) DWT comparators
to prevent write to critical system registers. For example,
on ARMv7-M, we can configure one DWT comparator to
write-protect the System Control Block SCB (0xE000ED00
– 0xE000ED8F) and DEMCR (0xE000EDFC) by setting the
ldr r0,=L
...
L: .word 0x12345678
movw r0,#0x5678
movt r0,#0x1234
...
Fig. 3. Constant Island Removal of a Load Constant
tbb [pc,r2]
L0: .byte (L1-L0)/2
.byte (L2-L0)/2
.byte (L3-L0)/2
...
L1: ...
L2: ...
L3: ...
...
adr.w r1,=L0
add.w r1,r1,r2,lsl #2
; indirect jump
mov pc,r1
L0: b.w L1
b.w L2
b.w L3
...
Fig. 4. Constant Island Removal of a Jump-Table Jump
lower bound and the size to 0xE000ED00 and 256 bytes,
respectively. Since MPU configuration registers are in the
SCB, they are protected as well. DWT registers reside in a
separate range (0xE0001000 – 0xE0001FFF), so we can
use another DWT comparator to write-protect the exact region.
C. Constant Island Removal
By default, ARM compilers generate code that has con-
stant data embedded in the code region (so-called “constant
islands”). Since PicoXOM prevents the code from reading
these constant islands, these programs will fail to execute
when used with PicoXOM. PicoXOM therefore transforms
these programs so that all data within the program is stored
outside of the code region.
We have identified two cases of constant islands generated
by LLVM’s ARM code generator: load constants and jump-
table jumps. Figures 3 and 4 show examples of the two
cases, respectively, as well as their corresponding execute-only
versions to which PicoXOM transforms them. Specifically, in
the left part of Figure 3, a load constant instruction loads a
constant from a PC-relative memory location L into register
r0. Such instructions are usually generated to quickly load an
irregular constant in light of the limited immediate encoding
scheme of the Thumb instruction set [3], [4]. PicoXOM trans-
forms such load constants into MOVW and MOVT instructions
that encode the 32-bit constant in two 16-bit immediates, as
the right part of Figure 3 shows. Jump-table jump instructions
(TBB and TBH) [3], [4] are used to implement large switch
statements; the second register operand (r2 in Figure 4) serves
as an index into a jump table pointed to by the first register
operand (pc in Figure 4), and a byte/half-word offset is loaded
from the jump table to add to the program counter (pc) to
calculate the target of the jump. Optimizing compilers like
GCC and LLVM usually select pc as the first register operand
in order to reduce register pressure, forcing the jump table
to be located next to the jump-table jump itself. PicoXOM
transforms such jump-table jumps into instruction sequences
like that shown in the right part of Figure 4; it encodes
the original jump table’s contents into a sequence of branch
instructions and expands the jump-table jump into a few
explicit instructions that calculate which branch instruction to
jump to and perform an indirect jump.
V. IMPLEMENTATION
We built our PicoXOM prototype for the ARMv7-M archi-
tecture. Our prototype provides MPU and DWT configurations
as a run-time component written in C. We implemented
constant island removal as a simple intermediate representation
(IR) pass in the LLVM 10.0 compiler [25]. The constant island
removal pass simply uses the existing -mexecute-only
option in LLVM’s Clang front-end and passes it along to the
link-time optimization (LTO) code generator. Our prototype
runs the constant island removal pass when linking the IR of
the application, libraries (e.g., newlib and compiler-rt), and
MPU and DWT configurations; this ensures that all code has
no constant islands. Our prototype adds 58 source lines of
C++ code to LLVM and has 177 source lines of C code in the
PicoXOM run-time. We leave the PicoXOM implementation
on ARMv8-M for future work.
Different ARM microcontrollers support different numbers
of MPU regions and DWT comparators, and the maximum
ranges of their DWT comparators may vary. Our prototype
runs on an STM32F469 Discovery board which supports up
to 8 MPU regions [37] and 4 DWT comparators [38]. Each
DWT comparator can only watch over a maximum address
range of 32 KB (a maximal mask value of 15), limiting our
prototype to the following two options:
1) Use all 4 DWT comparators to support a maximum code
size of 128 KB; the application must run in unprivileged mode
in order for the critical system registers to be write-protected.
2) Configure one DWT comparator to write-protect the
DWT registers (0xE0001000 – 0xE0001FFF) and another
to write-protect the SCB (0xE000ED00 – 0xE000ED8F)
and DEMCR (0xE000EDFC). This protects a maximum code
size of 64 KB using the remaining 2 DWT comparators.
To accommodate a wider range of applications on our
board with less performance loss, our prototype automatically
chooses one option over the other based on the application
code size. It rejects an application if the code size exceeds
our board’s 128 KB limit.
VI. EVALUATION
We evaluated PicoXOM on our STM32F469 Discovery
board [38] which has an ARM Cortex-M4 processor imple-
menting the ARMv7-M architecture that can run as fast as
180 MHz. The board comes with 2 MB of flash memory,
384 KB of SRAM, and 16 MB of SDRAM, and has an LCD
screen and a microSD card slot. We configured the board to
run at its fastest speed to understand the maximum impact that
PicoXOM can incur on performance.
To evaluate PicoXOM’s performance and code size over-
head, we used the BEEBS [28] and CoreMark-Pro [15]
benchmark suites and five embedded applications (FatFs-
RAM, FatFs-uSD, LCD-Animation, LCD-uSD, and PinLock).
BEEBS targets energy consumption measurement for em-
bedded platforms and is widely used in evaluating embed-
ded systems including uXOM [24], the state-of-the-art XOM
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE OVERHEAD ON BEEBS
Baseline PicoXOM Baseline PicoXOM
(ms) (×) (ms) (×)
aha-compress 821 1.0000 nettle-arcfour 814 1.0000
aha-mont64 856 0.9988 picojpeg 43,864 1.0027
bubblesort 4,392 1.0000 qrduino 40,877 1.0030
crc32 956 1.0000 rijndael 70,024 1.0018
ctl-string 630 1.0000 sglib-arraybin... 808 1.0000
ctl-vector 786 0.9987 sglib-arrayhea... 1,039 1.0000
cubic 35,140 1.0005 sglib-arrayqui... 735 1.0000
dijkstra 36,582 1.0000 sglib-dllist 1,800 1.0000
dtoa 631 1.0127 sglib-hashtable 1,302 1.0000
edn 3,167 1.0003 sglib-listinsert... 2,030 1.0000
fasta 16,900 0.9999 sglib-listsort 1,265 1.0008
fir 16,048 1.0000 sglib-queue 1,177 1.0000
frac 5,858 1.0323 sglib-rbtree 4,808 1.0025
huffbench 20,682 0.9995 slre 2,761 0.9873
levenshtein 2,685 1.0000 sqrt 38,506 1.0748
matmult-float 1,150 0.9991 st 20,906 1.0252
matmult-int 4,532 1.0000 stb perlin 5,132 1.0306
mergesort 24,353 1.0062 trio-snprintf 697 1.0100
nbody 128,126 1.0090 trio-sscanf 1,064 0.9915
ndes 2,039 0.9995 whetstone 112,754 1.0092
nettle-aes 5,687 0.9998 wikisort 113,195 1.0008
Min (×) 0.9873
Max (×) 1.0748
Geomean (×) 1.0046
implementation on ARM microcontrollers. It consists of a
wide range of programs characterizing different workloads
seen on embedded systems, including AES encryption, data
compression, and matrix multiplication. Of all 80 benchmarks
in BEEBS, we picked 42 benchmarks that have an execution
time longer than 500 milliseconds when executed for 10,240
iterations. CoreMark-Pro is a processor benchmark suite
that works on both high-performance processors and low-
end microcontrollers, featuring five integer benchmarks (e.g.,
JPEG image compression, XML parser, and SHA-256) and
four floating-point benchmarks (e.g., fast Fourier transform
and neural network) that stress the CPU and memory. FatFs-
RAM and FatFs-uSD operate a FAT file system on SDRAM
and an SD card, respectively. LCD-Animation displays a
single animated picture loaded from an SD card. LCD-uSD
displays multiple static pictures from an SD card with fading
transitions. PinLock simulates a smart lock reading user input
from a serial port and deciding whether to unlock (send an I/O
signal) based on whether the SHA-256 hashed input matches a
precomputed hash. The above five applications represent real-
world use cases of embedded devices and were also used to
evaluate previous work [2], [11], [12].
We used the LLVM compiler infrastructure [25] to compile
benchmarks and applications into the default non-XO format,
with MPU and DWT disabled; this is our baseline. We then
used PicoXOM’s configuration, i.e. enabling MPU, DWT, and
constant island removal. Note that with PicoXOM, none of the
benchmarks and applications exceeds the code size limitation
(128 KB) on our board. Only cjpeg-rose7-preset in CoreMark-
Pro has a code size larger than 64 KB and thereby has to run
in unprivileged mode.
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE OVERHEAD ON COREMARK-PRO
Baseline PicoXOM Baseline PicoXOM
(ms) (×) (ms) (×)
cjpeg-rose7-... 10,200 1.0001 parser-125k 12,363 1.0012
core 83,160 0.9918 radix2-big-64k 21,955 0.9961
linear alg-... 22,962 1.0000 sha-test 25,463 0.9995
loops-all-... 33,830 0.9995 zip-test 23,227 1.0000
nnet test 282,398 1.0017
Min (×) 0.9918
Max (×) 1.0017
Geomean (×) 0.9989
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Fig. 5. Performance Overhead on Real-World Applications
A. Performance
We measured PicoXOM’s performance on our benchmarks
and applications. We configured each BEEBS benchmark to
print the time, in milliseconds, for executing its workload
10,240 times. We ran each BEEBS benchmark 10 times
and report the average execution time. Each CoreMark-Pro
benchmark is pre-programmed to print out the execution time
in a similar way; the difference is that we configure each
benchmark to run a minimal number of iterations so that the
program takes at least 10 seconds to run for each experimental
trial. Again, we ran each benchmark 10 times and report the
average execution time. For the real-world applications, we
ran FatFs-RAM 10 times and report the average execution
time. The other applications exhibit higher variance in their
execution times as they access peripherals like an SD card,
an LCD screen, and a serial port, so we ran them 20 times
and report the average with a standard deviation. All other
programs exhibit a standard deviation of zero.
Tables I and II and Figure 5 present PicoXOM’s perfor-
mance on BEEBS, CoreMark-Pro, and the five real-world
applications, respectively; Figure 5 shows baseline execution
time in milliseconds on top of the Baseline bars. Overall,
PicoXOM incurs negligible performance overhead of 0.33%:
0.46% on BEEBS with a maximum of 7.48%, −0.11% on
CoreMark-Pro with a maximum of 0.17%, and 0.02% on
applications with a maximum of 0.22%. 13 programs exhibit
a minor speedup with PicoXOM. We re-ran our experiments
with the MPU and DWT disabled so that the only change
to performance is due to constant island removal and the
alignment of the code segment (the DWT on ARMv7-M
requires the monitored address range to be aligned by its
power-of-two size). In this configuration, we observed the
same speedups, so either constant island removal and/or code
TABLE III
CODE SIZE OVERHEAD ON BEEBS
Baseline (KB) PicoXOM (×)
Min 29 1.0329
Max 41 1.0675
Geomean — 1.0614
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Fig. 6. Code Size Overhead on CoreMark-Pro and Real-World Applications
alignment is causing the slight performance improvement.
B. Code Size
We measured the code size of benchmarks and applications
by using the size utility on generated binaries and collecting
the .text segment size.
Table III and Figure 6 show the baseline code size and
the overhead incurred by PicoXOM on BEEBS, CoreMark-
Pro, and the five real-world applications, respectively. Due
to space, we only present summarized results for BEEBS.
On average, PicoXOM increases the code size by 6.14% on
BEEBS, 4.39% on CoreMark-Pro, and 6.52% on the real-
world applications, with a 5.89% overall overhead. We studied
PicoXOM’s code size overhead and discovered that constant
island removal caused the majority of the code size overhead,
especially for programs with relatively large code bases like
CoreMark-Pro. In fact, the additional code that sets up the
MPU and DWT only contributes a minor part of the overhead
(1.22% and 0.53% on average, respectively).
VII. RELATED WORK
Two other XOM implementations exist for ARM micro-
controllers. uXOM [24] provides XOM for ARM Cortex-M
systems by transforming loads into special unprivileged load
instructions and configuring the MPU to make the code region
unreadable by unprivileged loads. uXOM similarly transforms
stores to protect the memory-mapped MPU configuration
registers. Since some loads and stores do not have unprivileged
counterparts, transforming them requires the compiler to insert
additional instructions, causing the majority of uXOM’s over-
head. PicoXOM is more efficient in both performance (0.33%
compared to uXOM’s 7.3%) and code size (5.89% compared
to uXOM’s 15.7%) as no such transformation is needed.
A trade-off for PicoXOM is the code size limit on some
ARMv7-M devices; we envision no such limit on ARMv8-
M. PCROP [36] is a programmable feature of the flash
memory which prevents the flash memory from being read out
and modified by application code. However, PCROP is only
available on some STMicroelectronics devices and cannot be
used for other types of memory. In contrast, PicoXOM relies
on the MPU and DWT features [3], [4] which can be found
on most conforming devices and can protect code stored in
any type of memory.
Hardware-assisted XOM has been explored on other ar-
chitectures. The AArch64 [5] and RISC-V [32] page tables
natively support XO permissions. NORAX [10] enables XOM
for commercial-off-the-shelf binaries on AArch64 that have
constant islands using static binary instrumentation and run-
time monitoring. Various approaches [8], [13], [17]–[19], [42]
leverage features of the MMU on Intel x86 processors to
implement XOM. None of these approaches are applicable
on ARM embedded devices lacking an MMU. Lie et al. [26]
proposed an architecture with memory encryption to mimic
XOM, but it only provides probabilistic guarantees and cannot
be directly applied to current embedded systems. Compared
to systems lacking native hardware XOM support, PicoXOM
is faster as it has nearly no overhead.
Software can emulate XOM. XnR [6] maintains a sliding
window of currently executing code pages and keeps only
these pages accessible. It still allows read accesses to a subset
of code pages and may incur higher overhead for a smaller
sliding window size due to frequent page permission changes.
LR2 [7] and kRˆX [31] instrument all load instructions to
prevent them from reading the code segment. While these soft-
ware XOM approaches can generally be ported to embedded
devices, they can be bypassed by attacker-manipulated control
flow and are less efficient than hardware-assisted XOM [24].
There are also methods of hardening embedded sys-
tems. Early versions of SAFECode [14] enforced spatial
and temporal memory safety on embedded applications, and
nesCheck [27] uses static analysis to build spatial mem-
ory safety for simple nesC [16] applications running on
TinyOS [20]. PicoXOM enforces weaker protection than mem-
ory safety but supports arbitrary C programs (unlike SAFE-
Code and nesCheck) and does not rely on heavy static analysis
like nesCheck. RECFISH [41], µRAI [2], and Silhouette [43]
mitigate control-flow hijacking attacks on embedded systems.
They protect forward-edge control flow using coarse-grained
CFI [1] and backward-edge control flow by using either a
protected shadow stack [9] or a return address encoding mech-
anism. EPOXY [12] randomizes the order of functions and
the location of a modified safe stack from CPI [23] to resist
control-flow hijacking attacks on bare-metal microcontrollers.
These systems do not enforce XOM and are still vulnerable
to forward-edge corruptions; they can incorporate PicoXOM’s
techniques to mitigate forward-edge attacks with negligible
additional overhead.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
This paper presented PicoXOM: a fast and novel XOM
system for ARMv7-M and ARMv8-M devices which leverages
ARM’s MPU and DWT unit. PicoXOM incurs an average
performance overhead of 0.33% and an average code size over-
head of 5.89% on the BEEBS and CoreMark-Pro benchmarks
suites and five real-world applications.
In future work, we will investigate techniques to ensure
that randomization techniques utilizing PicoXOM are effective
against brute-force attacks. Embedded systems have limited
code placement options for code layout randomization. We
will investigate whether the entropy is sufficient and develop
techniques to strengthen code randomization if necessary.
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